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Book reviews
John Quiggin, Generalized Expected Utility Theoiy: The Rank Dependent Model. 
KJuwer Academic Publishers, 1993. Pp. 207, xii. ISBN 0-7923-9302-3.
Expected Utility theory (EU) has long been the dominant theory in the field of 
decision making under risk and uncertainty. Yet there has also been a continuous 
flow of experimental evidence incompatible with EU, resulting in well-known 
paradoxes and effects, such as the Allais paradox, the Ellsberg paradox, the 
common ratio effect, framing effects, and preference reversals. Although EU 
theory may still carry the day as a normative theory, there is a growing need for 
new theories relaxing EU to satisfy the detected phenomena. One of the most 
popular branches in the non-EU theories is rank-dependent expected utility theory 
(RDEU). Although it has gained great popularity among economists, it is an 
inspiring model for psychologists too.
In EU, risk attitudes can be modelled by the shape of the utility function only. 
Aversion of risk is explained by a concave utility function (i.e., monotonically 
increasing but with decreasing acceleration) reflecting a diminishing marginal 
utility of wealth. Although this idea is in accord with general intuition, it does not 
seem natural that people’s attitudes towards outcomes form the sole factor 
determining behavior in risky settings. The interesting aspect of RDEU theories 
for psychologists is that attitudes towards probabilities are incorporated in the 
model.
The idea of generalizing EU by incorporating probability transformations is not 
new. Back in the fifties, Edwards studied a theory that introduced a straightfor­
ward probability-transformation function. In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky incor­
porated probability transformations in Prospect Theory, a theory that immediately 
became popular. A formal theory explaining behavior under risk, however, not 
only has to provide good descriptions of actual behavior but also has to prove its 
value in theoretical research. The crucial disadvantage of these earlier theories has 
been the lack of a sound theoretical underpinning. A straightforward transforma­
tion of probabilities leads to violations of stochastic dominance, the property 
stating that if an option A yields more than an option B with certainty, then A  is 
preferred to B. (Prospect theory evades this violation by the introduction of an 
editing operation and by restricting the range of considered prospects to prospects 
with at most two non-zero outcomes.) It will be of no surprise that there is no 
plausible axiomatization of these theories. The most important new feature of the
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RDEU model is that probabilities are transformed in a theoretically sound 
manner. Informally, one can state that in RDEU cumulative probabilities are 
transformed. By a cumulative probability we mean a probability of getting an 
outcome x or any outcome valued less than x. In this way, the rank order of the 
outcomes becomes crucial to the way the probabilities are transformed. The use of 
cumulative probabilities is also psychologically plausible. People often consider the 
probability of a compound event that is rank dependent, for example, the “chance
to break even” (e.g., Lopes, 1990).
Quiggin’s book is an introduction to and theoretical survey of the rank-depen­
dent model It starts with an introduction to EU and an overview of derived 
results, which are mostly applied in economics. After a brief survey of the major 
descriptive problems of EU (mentioned above) and some proposed solutions, 
Quiggin gives an extensive treatment of RDEU. An important project of the book 
then is to reformulate theoretical results of EU to make them compatible with 
RDEU, such as measures for risk, risk-aversion and dominance. The book con­
cludes with smaller expositions, including an RDEU explanation of gambling 
behavior, a discussion of normative components of RDEU, experimental results, 
axiomatizations, and a brief review of competing generalized expected utility 
models.
The most salient aspect of Quiggin’s book is that it has primarily been written 
for economists. This has some implications. Most importantly, it implies that most 
subjects and arguments are highly theoretical. As a consequence, many of the 
subjects the book is dealing with are not at the core of interest for psychologists. 
Quiggin also takes his readers as mathematically well skilled (although it must be 
said that, relatively, the mathematics is easy). Also, at some places he assumes 
some economic background knowledge (Gini-coefficients, Jensen’s inequality, 
“Arrow-Debreu style view of the world”). A  major advantage, however, is that the 
book is well structured, which makes it easy to skip paragraphs or chapters that are 
too economic for one’s personal taste.
The experimental part of the book is disappointing. First, as most economists, 
Quiggin has reservations about laboratory results, mostly because of the lack of 
proper incentives. So, Quiggin criticizes standard experimental procedures, high­
lighting a quite unintelligible critique of the isolation effect that is often used in 
justifying psychological research. Second, Quiggin does not pay much attention to
V
the available experimental results. This is a bit surprising as he underwrites the 
view that experimental findings made generalisations of EU worthwhile. One thus 
would also expect a report whether available experiments show that RDEU 
provides a good explanation of the reported paradoxes and effects. This is not the 
case. Quiggin's experimental discussion of the Allais paradox serves well the 
purpose of an example. He shows that RDEU can solve the paradox by giving a 
simple example of some values of functions of the model, values that are not 
generated by experiments or somehow related to experimental findings. Experi­
mental results that are presented provide only a fuzzy comparison between RDEU 
and other theories (some of which are not even discussed).
An important and interesting point suggests itself: what normative status should
Book reviews /Acta Psychologic a 88 (1995) 79-86 81
one attach to the RDEU model? Is RDEU a descriptive theory that agrees with 
normative canons as much as possible, or is it also defensible as a normative 
theory? One need not have an opinion on this issue (the difference is also not as 
sharp as one would wish) but it is certainly a point of interest. In his discussion of 
normative features of the model, Quiggin presents some arguments (connected 
with the dynamic consistency debate) pro and contra the normative appeal of EU 
but does not take a stand. In his discussion of the Allais paradox, however, 
Quiggin seems to hold the second point of view: the independence axiom (or the 
sure thing principle), characterizing EU, is normatively questionable. RDEU 
theory relaxes precisely this axiom, so RDEU could well be normatively appealing. 
The argument against the independence axiom is negative and, in our opinion, not 
very convincing in the way Quiggin presents it. He states that if two gambles share 
an identical outcome-probability event but the events of the two gambles are rank 
ordered differently, then there is no reason why the identical outcome-probability 
event must be equal to subjects.
In our opinion, it is not the exchangeability of events per se that should be 
questioned (although it boils down to a violation of this principle). The argument 
can be stated in an intuitively more appealing manner. Suppose I am pessimistic by 
nature. In this case I will pay more attention to the lower outcomes. It can be 
argued that this is also the rational thing to do for me. Should I not avoid bad 
outcomes to avoid disappointment? This implies that the rank order of the 
outcomes is a rationally relevant factor. We could strengthen this point by 
questioning the basic principle of rational decision making: the maximization of 
expected utility. Why should one not rather maximize expected utility, in some way 
bounded by the avoidance of disliked outcomes? If we accept that these factors are 
not only descriptively valid, but also have rational impact, RDEU also becomes 
interesting as a normative challenge to EU. We are not sure if this line of 
reasoning will stand serious scrutiny. However, if experiments show that people 
have preferences that are well described by RDEU  (but violate EU) and, further­
more, stick to their preferences even after due deliberation, then the normative 
appeal of RDEU is improved.
We have concentrated on the parts of the book that are of most interest to 
psychologists, and we are not enthusiastic on this respect. On the other hand, we 
think Quiggin’s book provides a good introduction and summary of the major 
theoretical results concerning RDEU theory. From a theoretical point of view 
Quiggin’s coverage of subjects is impressive. Quiggin also gives some highly 
recommendable arguments concerning gambling behavior and a nice proof of the 
naturalness of the RDEU form (§ 5.8). It is a pity the book contains quite a few 
typographic errors and some minor inaccuracies.
Hein Fennema and Thom Bezembinder 
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This book reflects the work of a group of Russian scientists in the area of 
expertise in classification tasks. This topic is approached from two different angles; 
a psychological one, mainly based on work in cognitive science and behavioral 
decision theory, and a knowledge-based systems engineering one, resulting in 
computer programs that carry out expert classification tasks.
The first approach can mainly be found in Chapters 4 to 7. In general, the 
reported results are, from a purely psychological point of view, not very new. They
mainly confirm what is already known: distinct limitations to human capabilities in 
complex multi-attribute classification problems. Experts outperform non-experts by 
being able to simplify the task by discarding attributes. Another trick is to place 
the attributes in a hierarchy which enables the classifier to deal with complexity by 
“generalizing” certain attributes.
The interesting side of the reported research is the linking of these limitations 
to computer programs that help the classifier in avoiding contradictions and 
inconsistencies in judgments that occur as a consequence of these limitations. Two 
algorithms for this are described in Chapters 5 and 6. They can be seen as an 
innovative way of dealing with inconsistencies in knowledge acquisition. Though 
Chapters 4 to 7 contain some references to the literature, important work in this 
area (for example the work on the cover-and-differentiatc algorithms) is over­
looked. More in general, some chapters are poor in references to research going 
on outside the group. Also, most of the references do not extend beyond 1987, 
which severely limits the usability of the book as a source for recent work in this
area.
The knowledge engineering part is mostly visible in Chapters 3 and 9 to 11. 
Chapter 3 gives a reasonable overview of work in the field of knowledge acquisi­
tion and elicitation, though it misses, as mentioned before, some recent develop­
ments, like workbenches for supporting knowledge elicitation. Chapters 9 to 11 
each describe a specific computer program used for knowledge acquisition in 
expert classification tasks. The ARIADNA system (Ch. 9) is an innovative way of 
computer-based interviewing, a dialogue between the system and the expert. In
